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IS A MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION
ACT ADVISABLE?
THE rapidly expanding volume of motor vehicle accident liti-
gation with its consequent burden upon the courts and its waste-
ful expense to litigants, suggests the necessity of devising a sub-
stitute for the cumbersome process of ordinary jury trials at com-
mon law to determine upon whom shall be placed the monetary
loss resulting from the destruction of life and property in motor
vehicle accidents. Already this kind of litigation has reached
such proportions that almost any day one may visit the trial
courts of general jurisdiction, safely predicting in advance that
he will find nearly half of the judges and juries listening to dia-
metrically opposite stories of witnesses under oath giving their
versions of th6 incidents and causes of automobile accidents in
which they are interested as friends of the litigants, often with
ambulance-chasing lawyers on one side of the counsel table and
still more unscrupulous lawyers for casualty insurance companies
on the other side, all befogging the issues and confusing' the juries
until they are finally obliged to reach their verdicts on the toss of
a coin within the secrecy of the jury rooms-well knowing that
however they may decide, the lawyers will get more money than
would have been required to pay the actual losses to the injured
parties if such trials had been avoided.
These conditions, which have sprung up within a decade as
a logical result of the immense increase in the number of motor
vehicles and the variety of uses therefor, are analogous to the
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conditions until recently existing in the domain of industry which
caused the enactment of the various workmen's compensation
acts; and it is suggested that the application of similar principles
to the troublesome problem of motor vehicle accident losses
might result in an equally satisfactory solution of the difficulty.
The responsibility for suggesting such innovation must be con-
sidered as that of the writer alone, without approval or disap-
proval of the magazine in which this article is published. An out-
line of possible legislation to accomplish such purposes will be
made and some legal authorities therefor will be cited.
With the exceptions as to willful negligence hereinafter men-
tioned, the general aim should be to eliminate entirely the question
of negligence in motor vehicle accidents; to make certain and
payable at all events a reasonable compensation for loss of life,
limb and property in all cases, spreading the cost of such com-
pensation over all users of motor vehicles on the public highways;
and to provide a summary method of determining the amount of
such losses.
This result can be accomplished through statutes providing
for compulsory, minimum accident compensation insurance under
a prescribed standard policy, and for determination of the extent
of losses, where the parties cannot agree, by informal trial before
a judge without a jury under procedure similar to present-day
trials of workmen's compensation cases.
One or several legislative acts might be found desirable. But
for the purposes of this article, it will be assumed that every-
thing necessary could be included in a single act, to be known as
the Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation Act. The first step
should be a provision requiring all motor vehicles1 to be registered
and their owners licensed before such vehicles may be used on the
public highways of this state, with the primary requirement that
the applicant for such license must take out a policy of accident
compensation insurance in a prescribed standard form for a
term of the same duration as his license, paying the premiums
therefore in advance and as a condition precedent to the issuance
of a license to him to use such motor vehicle on the public high-
1 The term "motor vehicle" has already been defined as including "all
vehicles propelled by any other than muscular power, except traction
engines, road rollers, fire wagons and engines, police patrol wagons,
ambulances, and such vehicles as, run only upon rails or tracks." G. S.
Minn. 1913, Sec. 2619. See also Id. Sec. 7057.
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ways.2  It is confidently believed that the power inhering in the
legislature under which present conditions have been prescribed
for registering and licensing motor vehicles is ample for the
further requirement of such compensation insurance. "That the
state possesses plenary powers over public highways and streets
is a proposition well settled."3 It has been specifically held that
the state may entirely prohibit the use of automobiles on some of
the public highways ;4 a fortiori, the state may prohibit the use
of motor vehicles on all public highways unless the general public
is protected by reasonable insurance against loss resulting from
the peculiar characteristics of motor vehicles. Such statutory
provision, applying to motor vehicles only, would not be uncon-
stitutional as class legislation ;5 and the fact that it applied only
to citizens of this state, leaving the highways open to transients
from other states without requiring such insurance from them,
would not make such statutory provision invalid as denying the
equal protection of the laws to our own citizens or infringing
any other constitutional right." If there should be any doubt
about the power of the legislature to enact such law, practically
the same result could be had indirectly by an elective system
modeled upon that of the Minnesota workmen's compensation
act, and so framed as to make it disastrous for any motor vehicle
owner who did not elect to come under the statute.
7
2 There is precedent for making compliance with a regulatory statute
a condition precedent to the issuance of a license. See Session Laws
Minnesota 1919, Chap. 510, Sec. 1.
3State v. Lawrence, (1914) 108 Miss. 291, 66 So. 745, quoting with
approval Terre Haute v. Kersey, (1902) 159 Ind. 300, 64 N. E. 469, 95
Am. St. Rep. 298.
4 State v. Phillips, (1910) 107 Me. 249, 78 Atl. 283; Com. v. Kingsbury,
(1908) 199 Mass. 542, 85 N. E. 848, 127 Am. St. Rep. 513.
5 Schaar v. Confroth, (1915) 128 Minn. 460, 151 N. W. 275, State
v. Swagerty, (1907) 203 Mo. 517, 102 S. W. 483; In re Hoffert, (1914)
34 S. 1). 271, 148 N. W. 20, 52 L. R. A. (N.S.) 949.
6 In re Hoffert, (1914) 34 S. D. 271, 148 N. W. 20, 52 L. R. A. (N.S.)
949; Com. v. Boyd, (1905) 188 Mass. 79, 74 N. E. 255, 108 Am. St. Rep.
464; Christy v. Elliott, (1905) 216 Ill. 31, 74 N. E. 1035, 108 Am. St. Rep.
196, 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 215. State v. Unwin, (1907) 75 N. J. L. 500, 68
AtI. 110; Ex parte Bozeman, (1913) 183 Ala. 91, 63 So. 201; Helena v.
Dunlap, (1912) 102 Ark. 131, 143 S. W. 138. State v. Cobb, (1905) 113
Mo. App. 156, 87 S. W. 551.
7This result could be accomplished by a statutory provision leaving it
optional with the motor vehicle owner to take out the prescribed insur-
ance or leave it, but providing that if he elected not to carry such insur-
ance, the license plates for display on his motor vehicle should be of a
design different from that of persons who had elected to come under the
act; that when sued at common law for the recovery of any damages
alleged to have been caused by or arising out of the use of his motor
vehicle on the public highways (except damages sustained by other motor
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The second step should be a provision of law prescribing a
standard form of compensation insurance policy covering motor
vehicle accidents, and prohibiting the issuance of any other or
different form of policy in this state.8 Such standard compensa-
tion policy shbuld -unconditionally require payment by the insurer
of all damages to the person or property of anyone not himself
wilfully negligent, resulting from accidents occurring during the
operation or use of the motor vehicle therein specified upon the
highways of this state, excepting personal injuries to the policy
holder9 or to his employees"° or to the driver or operator of such
motor vehicle at the time of the accidentl,-with the proviso,
vehicle owners or operators not under the act and in his own class), the
defense of contributory negligence should not be available to him, Mathi-
son v. Mpls. St. Ry. Co., (1917) 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71, that the
burden of proof of non-negligence on his own part should be cast upon
him in the trial of such actions, G. S. Minn. 1913, Sec. 4426 and cases there
cited, that he should have no homestead or other property exemptions
from the payment of such damages, G. S. Minn. 1913, Sec. 6961, Orr v.
Box, (1876) 22 Minn. 485, 487, that the injured party should have a specific
lien, presumptively good, on such uninsured motor vehicle from the date
and hour of the accident with immediate right of possession by the sheriff
or other like officer pending judgment and foreclosure, such lien to relate
back from the entry of any recovering judgment to the time of the acci-
dent and to take priority over all other liens or titles whether prior in
time or not, excepting liens or titles created prior to the passage of the
act (G. S. Minn. 1913, Sec. 7023-7024); and containing other drastic pro-
visions against the non-insured class, so as practically to compel them to
elect to come under the terms of the act requiring standard compensation
insurance. The authorities cited in this note, together with the Minnesota
workmen's compensation act, furnish the precedents (at least by analogy)
for .such semi-compulsory election.
8 The power of the legislature to prescribe a standard form of insur-
ance policy and prohibit the use of any other is well established. Kollitz
v. Equitable Co., (1904) 92 Minn. 234, 236, 99 N. W. 892; Wild Rice
Lumber Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., (1906) 99 Minn. 190, 108 N. W. 871; Dun-
nell's Digest, Vol. 2, Sec. 4759 and cases there cited.
9 The term "policy holder" is here used to designate the person usually
described as the "assured" or "insured," because the use of the latter
terms would not be strictly accurate in a policy where third persons were
made the primary beneficiaries as suggested in this article. The policy
holder himself should be excluded from the benefits of any colnnpulsory
clause of the policy, leaving that feature for private agreement between
him and the insurer in accordance with the present practice, because to
compel such benefits as to him would be in effect to compel him to insure
his own life and property against loss in motor vehicle accidents, since
the cost of such compulsory provision would certainly be added to the
premiums of the insurer on that basis.
10 Employees should be excluded because they are already provided
for by the Minneesota Workmen's Compensation Act. Session Laws
Minnesota 1913, Chap. 467 and amendments.
33 The driver or operator of the motor vehicle should be excluded
because he. is in position similar to that of the policy holder and coln-
pidsory insurance against the consequences of his own act would not be
desirable. That should be a matter for private agreement.
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however, that in the event of accidental collision or other mishap
involving two or more motor vehicles each covered by standard
compensation policies,, the damages restilting to all persons (in-
cluding damages to person and property of the policy holders
themselves, if not willfully negligent) shall be apportioned
between and paid by the insurers in proportion to the premiums
received by them upon such policies." With these excep-
fions, the payment of damages (always limited by the maximum
stated in the policy13 ) should be made as certain in all cases as
12 In case of accident involving two or more motor vehicles each
covered by standard compensation policies, damages should be paid to all
injured parties including the policy holders the-nselves because the actu-
aries of the insurers in each policy would have calculated (in fixing pre-
miums) the probability of paying damages to all injured persons except
their own policy holder, etc., which would therefore include damages to
any other motor vehicle licensee and his employees involved in the acci-
dent. By apportioning such damages, each insurer is favored rather than
penalized since his liability might be for all instead of a part only of the
damages. Moreover, any other disposition of collision cases would
result in the very litigation which it should be the purpose of this act to
avoid.
'3 In order to make insurance practical, some limit of liability should
be fixed as a basis for determining the cost of such insurance. Auto-
mobile accident liability policies now in use by some well known com-
panies fix such limits in anv one accident as follows: personal injuries
or death, $10,000; property injury to persons other than the policy holder,
$1,000; collision injury to policy holder, the value of his automobile-
which, on the average, is probably $1,500; also all expenses of litigation
arising"out of such accidents. The limit of liability in such policies for
one accident may, therefore, be roughly estimated at $15,000; and the same
limit fixed in the standard compensation policy here suggested would
probably cover the actual losses to be paid in ninety-nine cases out of a
hundred. True, in the standard compensation policy the losses would be
payable absolutely, while in the present private policies such losses are
dependent upon negligence or other wrongful act of the policy holder; but
the same thing was true as to employer's liability insurance when the
change was made from the old common law liability to the present work-
men's compensation act. And while it is the opinion of insurance men
that the cost to employers under the -workmen's compensation act is prob-
ably fifty per cent greater than under the old common law liability, yet
in various other respects the workmen's compensation act has proved so
beneficial that few employers would now vote .for a return to the old
system. And even if the -cost of motor vehicle accident insurance under
the standard compensation policy here suggested should also prove to be
fifty per cent greater than under the now existing private policies, that
additional burden upon motor vehicle owners might prove a welcome
substitute for their obligations under now existing liability policies to
expend unlimited time and energy in assisting the insurance companies
to prove them free from negligence-or to prove their unfortunate victims
guilty of negligence whenever an accident happens.
As to the hundredth case of an exceptionally bad accident injuring
many people and thereby rendering the limited amount fixed in the stand-
ard compensation policy inadequate to pay the damages, a statutory provi-
sion might be made whereby any of the injured parties after the remedy
against the insurer -had beeii .exhausted, could petition the district court
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the payment of life insurance upon death of the insured. All
questions of negligence, unless willful, should be expressly elim-
inated.14  The injured party should be made the: primary bene-
ficiary of the policy, with a joint and several right of action
against the insurer and the policy holder for damages not exceed-
ing the maximum stated in the policy; but in the event of collec-
tion from the policy holder separately, the latter should have a
right to entry of judgment in his favor and against the insurer
in the same action for the amount paid, upon filing an affidavit
that he had complied with the terms of the policy. 5 Other pro-
visions, covering details, should be incorporated in the policy.10
setting forth such facts in full and asking for leave, after due notice to
all parties in interest and hearing thereon, to bring suit at common law
for the recovery of damages from, the parties alleged to be responsible
for such injuries; and upon such leave being granted by the court (but
not otherwise) the uncompensated injured parties might proceed at com-
mon law without disabilities, the same as if the motor vehicle accident
compensation act did not exist.
14 Insurance against loss caused by one's own negligence is not con-
trary to public policy. Mpls. St. Ry. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., (1896) 64
Minn. 61, 69, 66 N. W. 132; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie -Transportation Co.,
(1886) 117 U. S. 312, 29 L. Ed. 873, 6 S. C. R. 750.
15 Of course, -such judgment could be opened by the insurer upon an
order to show cause and a hearing establishing prima facie the falsity of
the policy holder's affidavit for judgment, to the prejudice of the insurer;
but this procedure would place the burden upon the insurer to prove to
the satisfaction of the court that such judgment had been improperly
entered before there could be any trial or further litigation between in-
surer and policy holder upon the same state of facts litigated in the action
by the injured party against the policy holder, hence the volume of litiga-
tion would be reduced to a minimum without sacrificing the substantial
rights of any of the parties interested.
16 The insurer and the- policy holder should be permitted, by agree-
ment, to insert in the standard policy any reasonable provision not incon-
sistent with the requirements of the statute. Among such provisions
might be the following: (a) clauses covering fire, burglary and theft in-
surance, and also insuring the policy holder against any risk of damage
to person or property not covered by the standard provisions of the policy
and not inconsistent therewith; (b) requiring reasonably prompt notice
by the policy holder to the insurer of all accidents, and of all suits for
damages at common law, and making the policy holder liable for all
losses to the insurer caused by failure to give such notice, but without
affecting the insurer's liability to any injured third party; (c) requiring
the claimant for compensation to make reasonable proofs of loss to the
insurer, in a prescribed form if practical, and allowing the insurer a rea-
sonable time to investigate same and make payment before the claimant
should have the right to bring suit; (e) providing for arbitration (if
advisable in this class of insurance, which is doubtful) of losses where the
parties failed to agree, by procedure similar to that prescribed in standard
fire insurance policies or existing automobile insurance policies; (f) pro-
viding an exclusive method for cancellation of the policy by the insurer
after due notice to the policy holder (and possibly requiring the consent
of the insurance commissioner, or an order of court, after hearing); (g)
providing penalties or forfeitures for fraud or attempted fraud against
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All parties interested should be required to submit the deter-
mination of the amount of loss suffered, if unable to agree upon
such amount, and also all other matters in dispute, to trial by the
court without a jury under a summary procedure provided by
the act."7 Such provision cannot be made absolute, so as uncon-
ditionally to deprive the injured party of his constitutional right
to a common jury trial if he has a common law cause of action.
He must have his right of election to proceed either at common
law or under the act. But the common law action may be so
restricted and made so burdensome for him and the statutory
the insurer by the policy holder or injured party; (h) providing for the
protection of salvage, for subrogation when proper, and against changes
in optional clauses of the policy by agents without authority; (i) requiring
the policy holder and insurer to submit all controversies between them-
selves arising under the policy (including liability of the policy holder
to the insurer to reimburse for losses caused by willful negligence of the
policy holder) to trial by the court without a jury and under pleadings
framed by order of the court in the same action, if any, which determined
the loss and right of recovery of the injured party; (j) defining the words
"motor vehicle," "accident" and "willful negligence" in the terms of the
statute; (k) excluding from the operation of the policy railroad crossing
accidents and accidents involving instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
or accident for any reason under the operation of federal laws; (1) fix-
ing a limitation of time within which actions for compensation under the
policy must be brought, unless fixed by act; etc.
17 The section of the act governing procedure, in case of suit for com-
pensation under the policy, should follow generally similar provisions of
the workmen's compensation acts. It might be provided that the plaintiff
may file a verified complaint, setting forth-the names of the insurer and
the policy holder, the existence of the standard policy, the time and place
of the accident, and a brief description thereof showing that the policy
holder's' motor vehicle was involved therein, the nature and extent of the
damages resulting to the plaintiff, the making of the required proofs of
loss to the insurer and lapse of statutory time without payment, and
such other special facts in the particular case as might be necessary and
proper for the information of the judge; that a copy of said complaint
together with a summons in the usual form in civil actions be served upon
the defendants; that the defendants be required within the time stated
in the summons to file and serve a verified answer, specifically admitting,
denying or qualifying each material allegation of the complaint (general
denials being prohibited), and stating the contention of the defendant
with reference to the matters in dispute, and the ultimate facts relied upon
as a defense to the plaintiff's claim; that the plaintiff may serve and file
a reply, if so advised, within ten days thereafter; that the case shall then
be brought on for trial before the court without a jury by the usual pro-
cedure in civil actions in the court where the same is pending; that at the
time of trial the judge shall hear such witnesses and receive such evidence
as may be properly presented by either party, AND IN A SUMMARY
MANNER decide the merits of the controversy; that such determination
shall be filed in writing and shall contain a statement of facts as deter-
mined by said judge, that judgment shall be entered thereon in the same
manner as in the usual court cases and with the same effect; that no
appeal may be taken from such judgment, but the jurisdiction of the
supreme court to review questions of law by certiorari shall remain as in
other cases.
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action made so easy that, in actual practice, he will nearly always
elect to proceed under the statute. The act should provide that
any party suffering injury to person or property in any accident
giving rise to any claim or cause of action against any policy
holder protected, as to such claim, by standard accident compen-
sation insurance, will be presumed to have elected to come under
the provisions of the act unless an action at common law be com-
menced or complaint therein filed by him within thirty days after
the occurrence of the accident, and that after such time no action
can be brought except under the statute. It should be provided
further that if such injured party elects to sue at common law,
he shall lose his right of action for such loss against any insurer
in any standard accident compensation policy, and shall have none
of the benefits of the act; that in such common law action the
burden of proof shall be upon him to establish non-negligence on
his own part as well as negligence or other actionable wrong by
the defendant; that negligence, in connection with the accident,
of his agents, servants and employees shall be imputed to him;
that violation by him or his agents, servants or employees, at
the time of the accident, of any statute or ordinance relating to
the use of the public highways, shall constitute negligence by him
as a matter of law. 8 These, and other provisions which might
be suggested, would solve the problem of election of remedies
by the injured party and common law actions would be extreme-
ly rare. For such has been the effect of less drastic provisions
in the various workmen's compensation acts.
Other provisions of the act should be made to cover numer-
ous details.1" A schedule of compensation for various definable
1s The decisions sustaining the various workmen's compensation acts
and the atuhorities cited in the foregoing notes appended to this article
are ample to prove the power of the legislature to make the above sug-
gested provisions in the statute.
39 Such provisions might include: (a) placing the issuance and control
of motor vehicle licenses in the office of the insurance commissioner in-
stead of the secretary of state; (b) giving the insurance commissioner a
limited control over rates for such insurance, and the same general control
over the insurers as is vested by law in him with reference to insurance
companies generally; (c) requiring the name and address of- the insurer
(or its resident agent) and of the policy holder to be filed with the insur-
ance commissioner and also with the register of deeds where the title
to the motor vehicle is registered (Session Laws Minnesota 1919, chapter
510), and providing that the same shall be there recorded in a book kept
for that exclusive purpose and always open to public inspection; that such
record shall also show the serial number and date of the policy and date
of expiration thereof, and that a certified copy of such book entry shall
be prima facie evidence in any court of the existence of such policy with
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injuries is not suggested, as no reason is perceived why insurers
should not pay the losses as fixed 'by the court in each case,-just
as they are already doing indirectly under automobile accident
insurance policies voluntarily made by them.
The element of willful negligence has been purposely reserved
for separate discussion. The standard accident compensation
insurance policy should make the insurer liable to innocent per-
sons injured whether by the willful negligence of the policy
holder or not; for it is obvious that the benefits to such injured
persons should not be lessened by the wrongful acts of the policy
holder. Therefore, the weakest feature of the compensation
scheme suggested in this article is the danger of intentional or
reckless and indifferent destruction of life, limb or property with
the protection or benefits of such accident compensation insur-
ance in view. Of course, any intenztional act directly resulting
in such injury is not accidental,20 and, therefore, could not be
all the standard provisions in force within the dates specified; (d) pro-
viding that service of summons, notice or process in any action may be made
upon the insurer through the insurance commissioner, or upon the resident
agent of the insurer, if any, and that all proofs of loss or other notices
preceding the commencement of any action may be made upon the insur-
ance commissioner as agent of the insurer, if the claimant so elects, or
upon any resident agent of the insurer in this state, by mail in the ordinary
course; (e) stipulating that both the insurer and the policy holder are
presumed to have consented to all the terms, conditions and requirements
of the act by entering into the compensation insurance contract therein
provided; (f) providing that immediately upon insolvency or bankruptcy
of the insurer (of which condition, for the .purposes of this act, the opin-
ion of the insurance commissioner shall be prima facie evidence) the policy
holder's* motor vehicle license shall expire, and until reinsured, he shall
have the same status as if he voluntarily failed to register and procure a
license; (g) providing that all settlements of accident compensation
claims or controversies out of court shall be presumptively fair and valid,
and that any attempt to alter or modify or set aside such settlements
shall be tried by the court without a jury and under the same summary
procedure provided by the act for the trial of cases where no settlement
was agreed upon; (h) providing that any person accepting compensation
or other benefits of the act out of court, or bringing any action or pro-
ceeding in court under the act, shall be conclusively presumed to have
waived his common law right of action, if any, and shall be forever barred
from bringing any action or asserting any claim except under the act;
(i) excluding from the operation of the act railroad crossing accidents
and all accidents giving rise to claims or causes of action under federal
statutes; (j) either excluding street railways from the operation of the
act, or making special provision relative thereto; (k) defining the words
"motor vehicle," "accident" and other terms; and so on.
20 A legislative definition of the word "accident" is contained in Sec.
34h of the Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Act (General Laws of
Minnesota 1913, Chap. 467), and with slight modification it could be
adapted to the statute here suggested and made to read as follows: The
word "accident" shall be construed to mean an laexpected or unforeseen
event, happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault,
and producing at the time injury to the person or property of any one.
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brought within any accident compensation act. Collection of
accident compensation by any person after intentional injury,,
self-inflicted or to which he was a party, would amount to obtain-
ing money by false pretense which is statutory larceny. The rela-
tive losses to accident compensation insurers from that source
would not be as great as the present losses to fire insurance com-
panies from arson; for the acts constituting the crime could not
be as easily concealed.
But the element of willful negligence without crime would
still require careful attention; and effective safeguards against
it should be provided. Willful negligence has been judicially
defined as follows :21
"By willful negligence is meant not strictly negligence at all,
to speak exactly, since negligence implies inadvertence and when-
ever there is an exercise of the will in a particular direction there
is an end of inadvertence, but rather an intentional failure to
perform a manifest duty which is important to the person injured
in prevening the injury, in reckless disregard of the consequences
as affecting the life or property of another."
A legislative definition in precise language would be highly
desirable in any act of the nature here suggested; and it should
be provided further that violation, occurring at the time of acci-
dent, of any penal statute or ordinance relating to the use of the
public highways, if a misdemeanor, shall be prima facie evidence
of willful negligence on the part of the offender, and, if a gross
misdemeanor or felony, that it shall be willful negligence within
the meaning of the act. Such violation, if only a misdemeanor,
should be proved as any other fact in a civil action, but if a gross
misdemeanor or felony, then only by the record of a criminal
conviction thereof in some court; and when the fact of such will-
ful negligence was established it should be conclusively presumed
to have caused or contributed to the accident. The statute should
then provide that persons willfully negligent shall have rio recov-
ery themselves of any damages from any source in any accident
occurring at the time of commission of the acts within the dura-
tion of the conditions constituting such willful negligence; that all
other persons injured in such accidents shall have their common
law right of action against the willfully negligent offenders for
all damages suffered in excess of insurance benefits under the
statute; that all insurers shall have a right of action against them
21 Holwerson v. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co., (1900) 157 Mo. 216, 57 S. W.
777, 50 L. R. A. 850.
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for the recovery of all losses paid to others and all expenses
incurred as a result of such, accidents; that the liability in dam-
ages of such willfully negligent offenders under the act shall be
absolute, notwithstanding any exemption statutes or state insol-
vency laws to the contrary, 22 and that all their property of what-
ever nature or kind shall be subject to execution and sale to
satisfy such debts; and that all provisions* in any standard com-
pensation policy which otherwise would have been for the bene-
fit of the persons willfully negligent shall be 'rendered, inopera-
tive by such willful negligence.
It is believed that the foregoing, and other drastic provisions
which might be added, would be a sufficient deterrent against the
tendency of dishonest or reckless persons to cause injuries,
through willful negligence, because of the protection or benefits
of such accident compensation insurance. This belief is strength-
ened by the fact that willful negligence in motor vehicle accidents
is of necessity linked With personal danger to the offenders and
is opposed to their ,natural instincts of self-preservation. For
many years ordinary accident insurance has indemnified for per-
sonal injuries irrespective of negligence of the assured, and life
insurance has compensated for suicidal death; yet both accident
and life insurance have proved practical. Fire insurance also
compensates for negligent fire losses, barring exceptions express-
ly stated. But it has never been demonstrated that either acci-
dent, life or fire insurance has made the assured more negligent
than persons not insured. And with the advent of nation-wide
prohibition and its consequent elimination of intoxicated persons,
perhaps it may now be safely assumed that insurance losses from
wvllfully reckless destruction of life and property, successfully
concealed, would not be so great as to render impracticable the
above outlined plan of insurance covering motor vehicle accidents.
If all insurance companies should decline to issue standard
accident compensation policies, state insurance for the same pur-
pose would not be impossible-particularly when modeled upon
22 It is possible that the federal bankruptcy act, as now existing, would
not discharge a debtor from his obligation to pay a judgment against him
in favor of the insurer and based upon his willful negligence. Flanders
v. Mullin, (1905) 80 Vt. 124, 66 Atl. 789, 18 Am. Bank Rep. 708; Tinker
v. Colwell, (1904) 193 U. S. 473, 485, 48 L. Ed. 754, 24 S. C. R. 505, 11
Am. Bank Rep. 568; U. S. ex rel. Kelly v. Peters (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1910)
24 Am. Bank Rep. 206, 177 Fed. 885; McChristal v. Chisbee, (1906) 190
Mass. 120, 76 N. E. 511, 16 Am. Bank Rep. 838, Sec. 17 of the federal
bankruptcy act.
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state insurance under workmen's compensation acts. already. in
force in many states..... . '.-
The public is entitled to some protection. Much. is said by
motorists about the carelessness of the. publice but their comments
are not entirely justified. Before the advent of motor vehicles,
death or serious personal injury in accidents on the public high-
way was a rarity; now it is a commonplace. But the people are
not more careless now than then; in fact they are more careful,
because more fearful. The increase in accidents is due to the
danger inherent in the operation of motor vehicles by and among
people of average human frailty. It is not preventable by any
practical means yet devised. But perhaps the resulting mone-
tary loss may be spread over the motoring class most responsible
therefor, partially for their own benefit but with some correspond-
ing benefits to the non-motoring class least responsible. It may
be argued that such arrangement would place an unjust burden
upon the motorists, while relieving the non-motorists of the con-
sequences of their own negligence. The same argument was
made with reference to workmen's compensation acts; and
it is even more fallacious here than there.. People who motor
have an equal right of user of the public highways with people
who do not motor. But motorists as a class do not necessarily
have an unrestricted right to a user of the public highways inher-
ently nore dangerous than the user in fact enjoyed by all other
classes of people; for that is inequality in fact, whatever the the-
ory. The more dangerous user enjoyed by the motoring class justi-
fies the imposition upon it of reasonable burdens, such as the cost
of accident compensation insurance for the benefit of all the
people including those enjoying the less dangerous user. Negli-
gence is a relative term, being the lack of due care under all the
circumstances. Due care on the public highways today is much
more burdensome to all classes than it was before the appearance
of motor vehicles, or would now be in their absence. The motor-
ing class has placed this added burden of care upon the public
without bestowing any corresponding benefits. Would the ex-
pense of accident compensation insurance, placed upon the motor-
ing class for the benefit of the public, be any more than a fair
offset? For this burden of added care on the public will remain,
notwithstanding the elimination of negligence in any accident
compensation scheme, because the public will not sacrifice itself
for the uncertain benefits of a partially adequate money compen-
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sation. The motoring class has voluntarily assumed the lesser
burden of accident liability insurance, which is a long step in
the direction of accident compensation insurance. The writer
perceives no elements of natural justice opposed to such compen-
sation plan; and no serious legal obstacles have appeared from
this little study of the subject. A motor vehicle accident compen-
sation act seems desirable if it can be made workable; but can it?
The suggestion of an accident compensation act to the readers
of this magazine will doubtless meet with harsh criticism, if not
with ridicule. Such is the fate of any innovation among lawyers.
But the world moves. Doubtless many just criticisms can be
made and many improvements suggested upon the plan here
outlined. It is not pretended that this article is all-comprehen-
sive or exhaustive; it is merely suggestive. The writer has ven-
tured a little way out upon an uncharted sea, leaving the reader
to think it over and find his own way back or on.
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